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ALLPHIN REALTY, INC., 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
WESLEY F. SINE, 
Defendant and 
Respondent, 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 16036 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Allphin Realty, Inc., against Defendant-Respondent, Wesley F. 
Sine, for a real estate broker's commission. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, The Honorable 
David K. Winder granted Defendant-Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the ground that a written memorandum used to satisfy 
the Utah Statute of Frauds [UCA 25-5-4(5)] allowing a broker to 
bring suit for compensation must contain the sales price of the 
property to be sold. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal of trial court's 
decision granting Defendant-Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Respondent and Plaintiff-Appellant executed a 
memorandum of agreement entitled "Agreement of Commission" (R-43) 
dated October 13, 1976 wherein Defendant-Respondent agreed to pay 
a commission of $60,000 to Plaintiff-Appellant if the Newhouse 
Hotel was sold to one of the persons listed on the agreement or 
their associates through the efforts of Plaintiff-Appellant 
either directly or indirectly. 
Subsequently, on or about May 7, 1977, Plaintiff-Appel-
land obtained through its efforts an Offer to Purchase signed by 
one of the associates of those listed on the Agreement of Commis-
sion. Because of Defendant-Respondent's refusal to cooperate in 
consummating a sale, Plaintiff-Appellant filed suit for commission. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT-RESPON-
DENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The trial court held that the memorandum was not 
enforceable because it did not contain the selling price of the 
property mentioned in the agreement (R-76). 
-2-
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The agreement sought to be enforced here is an employ-
ment contract to pay a commission by a seller to a broker. 
Section 25-5-4, UCA, 1953 provides: 
In the following cases every agreement shall be 
void unless such agreement, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by 
the party to be charged therewith: ... 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing 
an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate 
for compensation. 
In 72 Am.Jur. 2d 805 Section 285, the reason for the 
rule is expressed as follows: 
"A memorandum is required by the statute of frauds, 
not for the purpose of obtaining a contract in writing, 
but merely to furnish written evidence, signed by the 
party to be charged or his duly authorized represen-
tative, of the obligation to be enforced against him. 
In other words, a memorandum is not required in order 
to make a contract but to evidence in writing that 
a contract has been made. There is, therefore, a 
considerable difference between a written contract 
and a written memorandum of an oral contract, and 
especially is this true so far as the parol evidence 
rule is concerned. A written contract is subject to 
that rule, but a memorandum of an oral contract may be 
shown by parol to be inaccurate or incomplete." 
In 72 Am.Jur. 2d 813 Section 295 referring to the form 
of a memorandum, it is stated: 
"No particular form of language or instrument is 
necessary to constitute a memorandum or note in writing 
under the Statute of Frauds, where the statute does not 
require that the contract itself be reduced to writing. 
A memorandum wholly untechnical in form may be suffic-
ient, and it may consist of any kind of writing, from a 
solemn deed down to mere hasty notes or memoranda in 
books or papers. A written recognition of the contract, 
expressed in one instrument or, in a proper case, in 
several writings, may constitute a sufficient memorandum, 
notwithstanding that it contains a request for release, 
a refusal to perform the contract, or a denial of its 
validity ... 
-3-
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"Generally speaking, a memorandum in writing meets 
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds that certain 
contracts shall be evidenced by writing if it contains 
the names of the parties, the terms and conditions of 
the contract, and a reasonably certain description of 
the subject matter of the contract, and if it is 
signed by the party to be charged." 
In 80 ALR, 1456 and 1457, in a treatise on the statute 
of fraud in cases between sellers and brokers, it is stated: 
" ... In construing such statutes with respect to 
the deficiency of the writing required thereunder, while 
the courts have had in view the consideration that this 
statute was intended to protect the land owner from the 
imposition of false claims by real estate brokers, and 
have therefore held that in order to entitle the broker 
to his commission there must be a writing sufficiently 
complying with the terms of the statute, whenever it 
was necessary to protect the broker from being defrauded 
by the land owner they have not failed to place a 
liberal construction upon the statute, consistent with 
its terms. So, expressions to the effect that this 
statute must not be construed as to enable the land 
owner to commit imposition and fraud upon an agent, 
where there has been a substantial compliance with the 
statute, are not uncommon in the adjudicated cases .... " 
In an action involving a broker's suit for a commission, 
the Utah Supreme Court in the NEY v. HARRISON 299 Pacific 2d 
1114 reasoned that the Utah statute simplified this problem and 
found that the contract itself need not be in writing but merely 
that some note or memorandum be available evidencing the contract 
said: 
"We are cognizant that decisions of courts have 
varied widely as to the sufficiency of writings which 
will suffice to meet the Statute of Frauds. Many of 
the decisions are explainable on the basis of sub-
stantial differences in the statutory provisions and 
terminologies, and in factual distinctions. But the 
explanation of other decisions lies only in which of 
the two policies implicit in the statute the particular 
court felt was paramount: The protection of the land-
owner from the imposition of spurious claims by real 
estate brokers, or the necessity of protecting the 
broker, who has rendered a bona fide service, from 
being refused just compensation for his work by the 
landowner. 
-4-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"In assaying whether the particular writing meets 
the requirement of our statute, the problem is con-
siderably simplified if we carefully observe that our 
statute, unlike that of many states, does not call for 
the contract itself to be in writing; it is enough if 
there is 'some note or memorandum thereof' which evidences 
the contract. The instant case appears to come within 
the doctrine of Hawaiian Equipment Co. Ltd. v. Eimco 
Corp., which approved the rule of the Restatement of 
Contracts: 
"'A memorandum, in order to make enforceable 
contract within the Statute, may be any document or 
writing, formal or informal, signed by the party to be 
charged * * * which states with reasonable certainty, 
"'(a) each party to the contract either by his own 
name, or by such a description as will serve to iden-
tify him, * * * and 
"'(b) the land, goods or other subject-matter to 
which the contract relates, and 
"'(c) the terms and conditions of all the promises 
constituting the contract by whom and to whom the 
promises are made.'" 
Further, this Court in FRITSCH v. HESS, 162 Pacific 70, 
where one of the issues before the court was whether certain 
letters an? telegrams were sufficient to constitute some note 
or memorandum to find a contract of employment, said: 
"We find that, so far as the contract of employment 
between the plaintiff and the defendant is concerned, 
these letters and telegrams are sufficient to con-
stitute 'some note or memorandum thereof in writing 
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith.' It 
is well settled that no particular form of words is 
necessary to comply with this statute, and that almost 
any kind of writing will be sufficient if it be signed 
by the party sought to be charged and contains the 
essential terms of a contract." 
In 12 Am.Jur. 2d 806 Section 45, the following comment 
is made regarding the Statute of Frauds and agreements between a 
broker and seller: 
-5-
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"The general rule that the memorandum of a con-
tract required to be in writing by the statute of 
frauds must contain the essential elements of the con-
tract so that they may be ascertained from the writing 
or writings without a resort to oral evidence applies 
to agreements employing brokers to sell or purchase 
real estate. It is held that the writing must unequiv-
ocally show the fact of employment of the broker 
seeking to recover his commission. The authorization 
need not be expressed, yet it may not be inferred from 
mere expression of the owner as to the price and terms 
of which he will, or desires to, dispose of the property. 
The writing should ordinarily state the compensation, 
describe the property, and be signed, at least by the 
principal, and, in some jurisdictions, by reason of 
express statutory requirements, by both parties. The 
writing need not, however, in the absence of an express 
requirement, state the price to be obtained or any 
other of the terms and details of a sale which may be 
required to be embodied in a contract for the sale of 
property. In some jurisdictions the statutes require 
the writing express, among other things, the period of 
time for which the broker's authority is to endure ... " 
The necessity of terms of sale in such a memorandum is 
also discussed in 80 ALR 1472, as follows: 
"The courts are agreed, in the absence of a statute 
expressly requiring it, that the writing need not 
contain the price to be obtained or other terms or 
details of the sale which may be required to be em-
bodied in a contract for the sale of the property ... 
"Thus, under the statute of Michigan requiring in 
substance an agreement to pay commissions for the sale 
of real estate, or a memorandum thereof, to be in 
writing, it has been held that the test for deter-
mining the sufficiency of the writing is not whether 
it contains all of the details necessary to be stated 
in an agreement to sell and convey real estate, but 
whether, in an action for the commission, the seller 
can defend upon the ground that the promise to pay the 
commission was not in writing. Hence, where the 
agreement contained a sufficient description of the 
property, and the definite promise to pay as commissions 
all over and above a designated amount per acre, 
though it did not state when and how the balance of 
the purchase price should be paid, was held sufficient 
under the statute ... 
-6-
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"And though it did not specify the selling price, 
or the terms of the sale, an agreement to pay a certain 
amoun~ ~f commission upon the sale of the property, 
descrlblng the same, at the time of the sale, was held 
sufficient on the theory that while the broker's right 
to commission would be contingent upon the owner's 
acceptance of a price and terms agreeable to him, where 
the owner does accept them (which he in the instant 
case did by signing a legal and enforceable land 
contract with the prospective purchaser), the fact that 
the contract for the payment of commission does not 
specify the selling price and terms of the sale is not 
material under the statute requiring it to be in 
writing. Greenberg v. Sakwinski (1920) 211 Mich. 498, 
179 N. W. 234." 
"The holding in Cochran v. Staman (Mich.) supra, 
was followed in Badger v. Finlayson (1922) 219 Mich. 
660, 189 N. W. 988, in which an agreement merely prom-
ising to pay commissions at a designated rate for 
services in disposing of the defendant's farm was sus-
tained as against the objection that it did not satisfy 
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. The court 
also, following Greenberg v. Sakwinski (Mich.) supra, 
held that the omission of the sale price was immaterial, 
saying: "l'ihen a written agreement to pay a commission 
for the sale of real estate is shown, it complies with 
the demand of the statute without any further proof as 
to the details of the sale.'" 
"So, under the Oregon statute, it is held that it 
is immaterial that the contract fails to state any sum 
which is to be paid for the property; it being suffi-
cient to enable the broker to recover his commission 
that the purchaser is willing and ready to purchase at 
the price the owner sees fit to ask. Henderson v. 
Lemke (1911) 60 Or. 363, 119 Pac. 482. 
"The statute of California requiring an agreement 
for the employment of a real estate broker, or a 
memorandum thereof, to be in writing, was construed in 
Baird v. Lescher (1908) 9 Cal. App. 65, 98 Pac. 49, as 
requiring only the authorization to be in writing, and 
not all of the terms of the contract of employment; and 
it was held that the fact that the agreement, which was 
not signed by the owner, contained blank spaces as ~o 
the terms upon which the property was to be sold, dld 
not make it insufficient memorandum under the statute 
(the unsigned agreement was accompanied with a letter, 
written by the owner, authorizing the owner to sell the 
property)." 
-7-
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said: 
This court in CASE v. RALPH 188 Pacific 640 on page 642 
"The statute is in force in a number of the states 
of the union, and has by the courts of last resort in 
those states frequently been applied. The courts 
generally hold that under such a statute a real estate 
broker or agent cannot recover commission for services 
rendered in either selling or procuring a purchaser for 
real property unless it appears: (1) That there is an 
express contract or agreement of authority in which the 
terms and conditions of his employment, if any and the 
amount of his commission, etc., are stated; (2) that 
such contract be in writing; (3) that in the absence of 
such express contract no recovery can be had for the 
reasonable value of the services rendered as upon a 
quantum meruit, nor for money and time expended for the 
use and benefit of the owner of the property ... " 
In Case v. Ralph cited above, the Utah Supreme Court 
indicated that the contract or memorandum should contain the terms 
of employment and the amount of the commission, stating no require-
ment concerning the terms of sale. 
In the case at hand, the parties are clearly identified, 
the property to be sold is identified and the terms and condi-
tions of the employment contract are stated in the written memo-
randum; the memorandum is signed by the party to be charged. 
Clearly the terms of employment are unequivocable. The trial 
court takes the position that the terms of the property sale (in 
particular the sales price of the property) were required to be 
on the employment agreement between the broker and the seller; 
however, the law and the cases do not so hold. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is respectfully submitted that the lower court 
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errored in finding that a note or memorandum as required by 
25-5-4(5) UCA, 1953, must contain the sale price of the property 
being sold. The memorandum did contain the essential elements of 
a contract for the employment of a broker, namely the party to be 
charged, the property to be sold, and the commission to be paid. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert E. Froerer 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
2610 Washington Boulevard 
P. o. Box 107 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
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